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RACE REVIEW IN A NATION SEEKING EQUALITY
Greyson Breal*
I. INTRODUCTION
In modern America, race relations continue to play a significant
role in national news and the enforcement of the laws. Equality is
oftentimes a game of multifaceted tug of war in which there is constantly
a struggle for the rights of differing races, ethnicities, and genders. The
foundation of knowledge and success in America is its educational
system. At the forefront of the educational system are the admissions
policies for each academic institution, which include the basis for the
types of students desired by each institution. Several factors are weighed
in admission processes, including academic achievement, extracurricular
involvement, and racial and socioeconomic backgrounds. In Fisher v.
University of Texas, the United States Supreme Court determined that the
University of Texas (“the University”), which reviewed each applicant’s
race in consideration of granting admission, was not violating the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by doing so.1 In a
country that promotes equality and fairness, should race even be a part of
a college application? Should the Supreme Court have ruled in this
manner?
In Fisher, the Court held that the University had identified
sufficient compelling interests in its goals for a diverse student body, that
those interests had not yet been met, that the interests were narrowly
tailored to achieve its goals, and that there were no better race-neutral
alternatives to the methods it had been employing.2 After ruling on those
four issues, the Court concluded that the University was not violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in reviewing race
in its admissions process.3 In their dissent, Justice Alito and Justice
Thomas detailed how the Court in Fisher mistakenly catered to the
University in its application of strict scrutiny review by allowing the
school to tiptoe around the difficulty of the standard.4
* J.D., Class of 2020, Mississippi College School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Christoph Henkel for his constant encouragement and insight during this
process.
1. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2215.
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In this Note, I argue: (1) that the review of race in an admissions
process results in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, (2) that
Fisher should have been ruled differently, and (3) for a new outlook on
how an admissions system should be in its focus on the “educational
benefits of diversity.” Part II will cover the background facts and
procedural history on the instant case, as well as a descriptive history of
the progression of the relevant laws and an explanation of the Court’s
decision in Fisher.5 Part III will discuss how the Court should have ruled,
and it will bring forth suggestions for how the University should mold its
admissions program in a manner that rewards not only academic success,
but extracurricular activities and achievements as well. In doing this, the
University should keep the Equal Protection Clause as its foundation,
remembering its plain meaning, and avoiding the weighing of racial
backgrounds in the process.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Procedural History
The University of Texas at Austin (“University”) utilizes an
admissions system that is comprised of two components.6 The first
component, Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law (implemented by the
University in 1998), requires the admission of any student who graduates
from a Texas high school in the top 10% of his or her class.7 The second
component, which fills the remaining spots in the freshman class, involves
the combination of each applicant’s “Academic Index” and “Personal
Achievement Index.”8 The “Academic Index” is made up of the student’s
SAT score and high school academic performance, while the “Personal
Achievement Index” is a comprehensive review of numerous factors,
including the student’s race.9
Abigail Fisher, a Caucasian applicant, was not in the top 10% of
her high school class.10
Her application was reviewed under the
“Academic Index” and “Personal Achievement Index” lens, and she was
denied admission to the University’s 2008 freshman class.11 Fisher filed
suit, arguing that by considering race as a part of the holistic-review
process, the University disadvantaged her and other Caucasian applicants,
5. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. 2198.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.12
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
granted summary judgment in favor of the University, and the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.13 Because the Court of Appeals
applied an “overly deferential” good-faith standard in assessing the
constitutionality of the University’s admissions program, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari and vacated the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.14 The case was remanded to assess the claims under
a more appropriate standard, and the Court of Appeals once again
affirmed summary judgment in the University’s favor.15 The Supreme
Court of the United States again granted certiorari, and finally affirmed
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.16
B. Background and History of the Law
Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law and the rulings from the Grutter and
Gratz cases eventually influenced the University’s admissions program to
consist of what was in place at the time of Fisher, but the program went
through an evolution on its way to the instant case. In Grutter v.
Bollinger, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit
the University of Michigan’s law school from the narrowly tailored use of
race in its admissions process in furthering the compelling interest of
diversity.17 In Gratz v. Bollinger, it was held that the University of
Michigan’s admissions process was not narrowly tailored because it
resulted in the admission of nearly every “underrepresented” minority.18
A series of past cases led to three controlling principles set by the District
Court’s hearing of Fisher, which were evaluated and decided upon in the
case at hand. This section discusses the evolution of the admissions
program as well as the case law leading up to the instant case.
1. History of the Admissions System
Up until 1996, the admissions decisions made by the University
were based solely on an “Academic Index,” which combines an
applicant’s SAT score with his or her high school academic
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2207.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003).
18. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 S. Ct. 244, 246 (2003).
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performance.19 Racial minorities were given preference amidst this
process.20 In the Hopwood v. Texas case of 1996, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that the consideration of race in admissions
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.21 In
response, the University began combining each applicant’s Academic
Index with his or her “Personal Achievement Index,” which is a numerical
score based on a holistic review of an applicant’s essays, experience,
activities, community service, and other “special characteristics.”22 The
Texas Legislature had its own response to Hopwood—it enacted the Top
Ten Percent Law, which guarantees admission to any public university in
the state to any student who graduates from a Texas high school in the top
ten percent of his or her class.23 In 1998, the University implemented the
Top Ten Percent Law and, after filling every spot with qualifying
students, filled the remaining spots using its system involving the
Academic and Personal Achievement Indexes.24 The University used this
admissions system until 2003 and the arrival of the Grutter and Gratz
cases, which altered its strategy.25
2. Grutter and Gratz—Evolution of the Admissions System
In Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court reprimanded the University of
Michigan’s admissions system for its predetermination of points toward
racial minority applicants.26 Grutter v. Bollinger, on the other hand, dealt
with the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions program.27 In
Grutter, the Court held that its holistic review system, which only used
race as a broad component of an application, was appropriate.28 In doing
so, the Court overruled the holding in Hopwood that any consideration of
race in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause.29 Following
Grutter, the University was faced with the issue of whether its admissions
policy was allowing it to provide “the educational benefits of a diverse
student body . . . to all of the University’s undergraduate students.”30
19. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.
20. Id.
21. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935 (5th Cir. 1996).
22. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 S. Ct. 244, 246 (2003).
27. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003).
28. Id.
29. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.
30. Id. at 2205-06.
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After determining that it was not providing those benefits, the University
submitted a request to the Board of Regents to begin taking race into
consideration as one of “the many ways in which [an] academically
qualified individual might contribute to, and benefit from, the rich,
diverse, and challenging educational environment of the University.”31
Stemming from this is the admissions policy that the University still uses
to this day.32
The new policy implemented by the University was the result of
Grutter, but it was not developed using the exact framework specified by
the case.33 Today, the University fills up to 75 percent of its incoming
freshman class using the Top Ten Percent Plan.34 While it did not adopt
an identical policy to that of Grutter for filling the majority of its classes,
the University did adopt a similar policy to fill the remaining 25 percent
of its incoming freshman class by evaluating the previously mentioned
Academic and Personal Achievement Indexes.35 However, the Personal
Achievement Index began using race as a “subfactor” by analyzing the
potential contributions made by an applicant based on his or her
experiences, activities, and other “special circumstances.”36 These
“special circumstances” include socioeconomic situations of the
applicants and many other factors, including race.37 The decision makers
over these applications undergo extensive training to make sure to
maintain consistency in their evaluations.38
3. Fisher I’s Controlling Principles
The admissions system at the University in 2008 resulted in the
lawsuit by Abigail Fisher, in which she alleged that the University’s
consideration of race in its application process violated the Equal
Protection Clause.39 After the District Court granted summary judgment
in favor of the University, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
Fisher I.40 The decision was then vacated, remanded, affirmed, and

31. Id. at 2206.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. 2198.
40. Id.
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certiorari was granted before the instant case, but not before some key
controlling principles were laid out by Fisher I.41
Relevant to the issue in the instant case are three controlling
principles from Fisher I.42 First, “because racial characteristics so seldom
provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment, [r]ace may not be
considered [by a university] unless the admissions process can withstand
strict scrutiny.”43 “Strict scrutiny” requires the University to clearly show
that its purpose is both “constitutionally permissible and substantial, and
that its use of the classification is necessary
. . . to the accomplishment
of its purpose.”44 Second, “the decision to pursue ‘the educational
benefits that flow from student body diversity’” is an “academic judgment
to which some, but not complete, judicial deference is proper.”45 A quota
cannot be established for a particular race or group of people, but once a
university gives a reasoned explanation for its decision, “deference must
be given to the University’s conclusion.”46 Third, “no deference is owed
when determining whether the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve
the university’s permissible goals.”47 A university must prove that “raceneutral alternatives” that are both “available” and “workable” “do not
suffice” to promote its purpose.48 After much deliberation, the Court of
Appeals determined that the University’s admissions program “conformed
with the strict scrutiny mandated by Fisher I.”49
C. The Instant Case
In an attempt to have the judgment of the Court of Appeals
reversed, Fisher made four arguments: (1) that the University has not
expressed its interest with clarity, (2) that the University has no need to
consider race, (3) that considering race was not necessary because it
merely has a “minimal impact” in advancing the University’s interest, and
(4) that there are various other ways of achieving the University’s
interest.50

41. Id.
42. Id. at 2207-08.
43. Id. at 2208.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2210-12.
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1. Majority Holding
In her first argument, Fisher claimed that the University did not
specifically express its compelling interest with enough care.51 She
emphasized that, without clarifying its end goal, the University could not
possibly have its admissions program reviewed by a court to determine
whether its program was “narrowly tailored” to that goal.52 The Court
prefaced its holding on this matter by determining that a university may
implement a race-conscious admissions program as a means of obtaining
“the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity,” rather
than for the purpose of obtaining a specific enrollment of minority
students.53 According to the Court, those benefits could be achieved by
increasing minority enrollment, but the increase in minority enrollment
cannot be something put into a number-oriented goal, as Fisher seemed to
suggest.54 However, the Court noted, a university’s educational goals
cannot be so broad and vague that they cannot be measured.55 Referring
to the record, the Court declared that the University “articulated concrete
and precise goals” when it implemented its policy at the time.56 Citing
specific language in the University’s admissions policy, the Court noted
that the University identified educational values it wished to realize
through its admissions process: “promotion of cross-racial understanding”
and preparation of students “for an increasingly diverse workforce and
society.”57 These objectives, the Court reiterated, directly resembled a
“compelling interest” as approved in past cases.58 Citing the record as its
main basis for rebuttal of Fisher’s first contention, the Court denied her
argument that the University’s compelling interests were not specified
enough.59
Fisher’s second argument was that the University had no need to
consider race in its admissions because it had already “achieved critical
mass” by 2003 using the Top Ten Percent Plan and the race-inclusive
review of applicants.60 She also argued that the University bore the
burden of proving it had not acquired the educational benefits of diversity

51. Id. at 2210.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2211.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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before turning to a race-inclusive plan.61 Although this is true, the Court
noted, the University did prove that it had not yet obtained the benefits by
conducting months of studies and data review and ultimately concluded
that using race-neutral policies and programs did not help achieve racial
diversity at the school.62 Citing once again to the record, the Court
referenced both statistical and anecdotal data that showed a lack of growth
in minority enrollment.63 In denying Fisher’s second argument, the Court
noted that although a college has the duty to constantly reconsider a raceinclusive review of its applicants, the University in this case had done its
due diligence and still determined that its goals of diversity had not yet
been met.64
In her third argument, Fisher claimed that considering race was
unnecessary because it had only a “minimal impact” in furthering the
compelling interest of the University.65 The Court determined that this
contention was unsupported.66 By referencing the massive increase in
Hispanic and African-American enrollees between 2003 and 2007, the
Court held that the consideration of race had had a limited, but significant,
effect on the diversity of the University’s freshman class.67 Although race
consciousness had a limited effect on the admissions process, the Court
noted it should be viewed as the University’s effort to narrowly tailor its
compelling interests, rather than acting unconstitutionally.68
The final argument made by Fisher was that the University’s
compelling interest could have been achieved through a multitude of other
race-neutral methods.69 However, the Court determined that, at the time
of her application, none of her suggested alternatives were “workable
means for the University to attain the benefits of diversity it sought.”70
One suggestion by Fisher was that the University increase its efforts in
outreach to African-American and Hispanic applicants.71 But, the
University had already done so by creating new scholarship programs and
opening new admission centers.72 In addition, the University previously
spent seven years trying to achieve its compelling interest by means of a
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2212.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2213.
72. Id.
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race-neutral review and was unsuccessful.73 Another suggestion given by
Fisher was that the University should alter the weight given to academic
and socioeconomic factors in its admissions.74 However, the Court noted
she ignored the fact that an “enhanced” consideration of socioeconomic
(and other) factors had already been attempted by the school.75 Fisher’s
last suggestion was that the University should uncap the Top Ten Percent
Plan and admit more students through a percentage plan.76 The Court
reiterated that the plan’s purpose was to encourage minority enrollment.77
In the past, percentage plans had been “adopted with racially segregated
neighborhoods and schools front and center,” giving the Court reason to
uphold that “it is race consciousness, not blindness to race, that drives
such plans.”78 To strengthen its response, the Court discussed that even if
class rank was the primary standard in admission, admitting students
based on rank alone excludes those students who spent much of their high
school careers doing extracurricular activities, such as playing sports or
music.79 “Class rank is a single metric and, like any single metric, it will
capture certain types of people and miss others.”80
The Court concluded its denial of Fisher’s final argument by
stating that none of the suggested alternatives to meeting the University’s
educational goals were “available” or “workable,” and that the University
had met its burden of showing that its admissions policy was “narrowly
tailored” at the time of Fisher’s application.81 This was the key to the
University justifying its use of race in the admissions process. The
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the prior judgment of the
Court of Appeals but made sure to provide that it is the University’s
“ongoing obligation” to make sure its admissions policies are current and
appropriate.82
2. Dissent
In quite a lengthy dissent, Justice Alito and Justice Thomas laid
out the specific ways in which the Court could have ruled differently
regarding its avoidance of traditional strict scrutiny review. Justice Alito
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2214.
82. Id. at 2215.
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recalled the initial decision in the Fisher I case in which the Court held
that strict scrutiny required the University to show that reviewing race and
ethnicity in its admissions process served compelling interests, and that its
admissions plan was narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.83 On
remand, the University never met those requirements.84 To this day,
according to Justice Alito, the University has yet to identify with any
specificity the interests that are supposed to be served through the review
of race and ethnicity in its admissions process.85 By building on these
points, Justice Alito and Justice Thomas explained in-depth how the Court
in Fisher: (1) should not have ruled that the University passed strict
scrutiny and (2) how the Court tiptoed around the normal standard of strict
scrutiny review in order to cater to the University.86
Justice Alito first contended that the University’s race-conscious
admissions program could not satisfy strict scrutiny because it failed to
define its interest in furthering the educational benefits of diversity.87 He
also said that the University failed to narrowly tailor its program to
achieve its interest, which is required under strict scrutiny.88 He began
these claims by referring to the Equal Protection Clause and by citing the
Miller opinion, which profoundly stated that “[A]t the heart of the
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that
the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class.”89 He quoted
another case which said, “[D]istinctions between citizens solely because
of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people.”90
Justice Alito reiterated his stance that individuals should be treated as
humans, not as byproducts of different groups of people.
When the University adopted its policy, according to Justice Alito,
it “characterized its compelling interest as obtaining a ‘critical mass’ of
underrepresented minorities.”91 Yet, the University failed to define what
it meant by “critical mass”—it only determined that it is not an absolute
number.92 This caused Justice Alito to infer that the University wanted to
keep it on a “we’ll let you know when we see it” basis, in which there was

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2220.
88. Id.
89. Id at 2221 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995)).
90. Id. (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000)).
91. Id.
92. Id.

356

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 38:3

no real way of measuring whether its goals had been achieved.93 For this
reason, the University’s goals could not be determined, in Justice Alito’s
opinion, to be “concrete.”94 Although the University gave nothing but a
vague interest determination in defining its goals, it identified four more
specific goals: demographic parity, classroom diversity, intraracial
diversity, and avoiding racial isolation.95 It was never determined by the
majority or the University whether even these specific goals could survive
strict scrutiny.96
Regarding the first goal, Justice Alito said, “[I]f a demographic
discrepancy can serve as a gauge that justifies the use of racial
discrimination, then racial discrimination can be justified on that basis
until demographic parity is reached.”97 Thus, he says, this goal cannot be
used to satisfy strict scrutiny.98 The second goal, classroom diversity,
could not have been used to satisfy strict scrutiny either because, once
again, the University failed to identify a level of classroom diversity that it
sought to be sufficient.99 The third goal, intraracial diversity, also failed
because it relies on the assumption that there is something wrong with the
African-Americans and Hispanics being admitted through the race-neutral
Top Ten Percent Plan.100 The assumption is that the minorities being
granted admission through the plan are coming from “lower-performing,
radically identifiable schools.”101 Lastly, the University claimed an
interest in avoiding feelings of isolation in minorities.102 Because of the
vagueness of this goal, it could not possibly satisfy strict scrutiny, as it
cannot be measured.103
Justice Alito’s second major point addressed the Court’s three
reasons for avoiding the application of the normal strict scrutiny standard
in Fisher.104 First, he quoted the Court’s statement that while the
“evidentiary gap perhaps could be filled by a remand to the district court
for further factfinding” in “an ordinary case,” that will not work here
because “when petitioner’s application was rejected, . . . the University’s
combined percentage plan/holistic review approach to admission had been
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2223.
95. Id. at 2224.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2225-26.
98. Id. at 2226.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2230.
101. Id. at 2232.
102. Id. at 2235.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2239.
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in effect for just three years.”105 Justice Alito went on to refute this
statement by the Court saying that the “Equal Protection Clause does not
provide a 3-year grace period for racial discrimination.”106 The Court
erred, in his opinion, by being lenient with the interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause in light of the case at hand. The second reason the
Court went around the normal standard of review was because the
University (in an attempt to excuse itself from having sufficient evidence)
“had no reason to keep extensive data.”107 “This is not—as the Court
claims—a ‘good-faith effort to comply with the law.’”108 The third reason
given by Justice Alito was that the majority noted the fact that, in the time
this issue had been litigated, the petitioner had already graduated from
another school, and that this case may not offer much outlook for future
cases of this matter.109
Justice Alito concluded his dissent by stating that what was “at
stake” in Fisher was whether university authorities could justify using
racial discrimination to serve the interest of promoting educational
diversity without explaining why they must do so.110 Although the
University never fully explained its reasoning for using discrimination on
the basis of race and, even though its position relied on “a series of
unsupported assumptions,” the majority concluded that it had met its
burden. According to Justice Alito, that conclusion was “remarkably
wrong.”111
III. ANALYSIS
In Fisher, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
of the Court of Appeals, which granted summary judgment in favor of the
University and held that its admissions system did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.112 A three-step analysis
will be brought to light detailing the Equal Protection Clause, how the
Court should have ruled in Fisher, and suggestions for the admissions
system of the University in achieving its goals of invoking the
“educational benefits of diversity.”

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2240.
109. Id. at 2242.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2243.
112. Id. at 2207.
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A. Was the Equal Protection Clause Violated?
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
addresses citizenship and the rights of citizens.113 Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment contains the Equal Protection Clause, which is
itself at the heart of Fisher:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.114
The phrase “nor shall any state . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” highlights the key concerns
of the Fourteenth Amendment, demanding that the states must treat all
individuals the same as others in similar circumstances. The Equal
Protection Clause is vital to the enforcement of civil rights of individuals.
In Fisher’s case, she was not treated the same as all other applicants of the
University, and she should have been granted relief under the Equal
Protection Clause.
In a nation where over half of the students in college are
Caucasian, reviewing race as part of the admissions process would never
help a Caucasian student gain admission, but it would almost always
produce a negative effect. The University of Texas, in promoting a
“compelling interest” that resulted in increased levels of diversity, allowed
the characteristic of race to be included in its admissions process.
Although diversity, which cannot be measured, was cited as its primary
goal, the University strategically ousted the efforts of an already heavily
represented sector. In essence, it justified its behavior, not by admitting
the most academically and well-rounded students, but by punishing a
group of students for the sole fact that they were born into the majority of
the race which already made up over half of the college population.
The Equal Protection Clause clearly states no state shall “deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”115 In
reading this plainly, anyone could determine that if someone is treated
113. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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differently than another in similar circumstances, his or her rights under
the Equal Protection Clause would be violated. While there are ways to
get around the strictness of the clause, it must first be determined whether
the rights of Fisher and other Caucasian applicants were infringed upon.
In the review of students’ applications that were not granted admission
through the Top Ten Percent Plan, a factor of the application was the race
of the applicant.116 The promotion of diversity can absolutely be
understood and justified, but this does not bring forth the authority of a
school to pick and choose its admitted students while considering their
racial or ethnical background. In order for the Equal Protection Clause to
be honored to its fullest extent, race should not be considered in the
admissions process of a university, as that would unfairly prejudice
anyone who is a member of a race in which there is considered to be “too
many of.” Because race was a factor in the admissions process at the
University, it can be stated with confidence that the school disadvantaged
certain races and ethnic groups under the Equal Protection Clause—in
fact, there was no equal protection at all.
B. Analogy to Hopwood
Fisher, while circumstantially different than that of the Hopwood
case, should have been decided in the same manner, and Hopwood should
still be good law today. In Hopwood, a Caucasian female was denied
admission to the University of Texas School of Law, despite being more
academically qualified than most applicants in her year.117 It was
ultimately ruled that the inclusion of race in the admissions process at the
school violated the Equal Protection Clause, and that the inclusion of race
should not be used as a way to “fix” bad minority community relations.118
In Fisher, Ms. Fisher claimed she was disadvantaged because of the
application process, which considered race as a subfactor in granting
admission.119 The cases differ in the underlying situations surrounding
the applicants who brought actions against their respective schools, but
because of the possibilities presented by Hopwood, it should remain intact
as a law in blanketed form.
Hopwood presented the potential result of a university denying an
academically strong student admission because of the inclusion of race in
the admissions program.120 The plaintiff’s academic success was
116. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2202.
117. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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ultimately undermined by her race, and that is not and should not be the
intention of any institution. Hopwood turns the focus on a student’s
credentials and skillset, rather than factors concerning his or her race,
which cannot be controlled. For that reason, Fisher should have been
ruled in the same manner as Hopwood. Although the plaintiff in Fisher
was not considered to be an academic superior, the ruling in that case set
an unjust precedent that strayed from the court in Hopwood. Had Ms.
Fisher been strong academically, but not in the top ten percent of her
class, she may still have not been granted admission because the school
was using the representation of her race against her. It is interesting to
consider all of the possibilities in which Ms. Fisher could have been
discriminated against in situations that were immeasurable and out of her
control.
This gray-area standard the University was using in its application
review is a key reason why Hopwood should apply as a simple, blanketed
law today. It held, quite plainly, that the review of race in the admissions
process violated the Equal Protection Clause. Although this ruling may
cause anger and uproar to some, it provides a clear basis for the standard
at which an admissions program should be held—and in full transparency.
When a university can tailor its program to meet immeasurable goals, it
can potentially do anything with the program that its employees intend.
C. Improvements to the Admissions Program
When a university sets out to declare its main objective or set of
objectives for its student body, the most important issue to decide upon is
whether it will focus more on academic strength alone or a combination of
academic strength and personal achievements. Once this mission can be
established, it can be easier to decide which kind of students will be
granted admission to the institution. In the case of the University, a
combination of the two seems to be what is desired most.
The University’s current admissions system fills up to 75 percent
of its incoming freshman class using the Top Ten Percent Plan.121 By
doing this, it portrays that its focus with incoming classes is on academic
success. Where it could improve is in filling the remaining spots using the
“Academic Index” and “Personal Achievement Index.” The “Personal
Achievement Index,” in order to align with the Equal Protection Clause,
should completely exclude race from its list of components. The best way
to have equality in this country is to eliminate the racial lens which things
are viewed through. People shall be seen as people, as humans. When
one thinks of personal achievements, he or she thinks about experiences,
121. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2206.
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hobbies, talents, obstacles that have been overcome, and other things that
have required initiative to complete. The “Personal Achievement Index”
should weigh all of these types of factors in students to find the ones who
will bring the most diversity to the collegiate table because of their
experiences in the extracurricular world. It seems unfair to weigh the race
of someone as a deciding factor in his or her admission, when he or she
could just be viewed as a person with certain talents or capabilities. As
long as this country uses race as a reason to promote or demote a person,
it will never be the land of the free. We do not choose to be born into a
certain race—it is given to us. And for that reason, it should not limit
anyone of any race from being what he or she wants to be, if his or her
experiences can contribute to our society. The University should mold its
admissions program in a way that rewards academic success thus far, but
also rewards experiences from extracurricular activities. The Equal
Protection Clause should forever remain a stronghold in this field.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court in Fisher faced four arguments: (1) that the University
had not sufficiently identified its compelling interests regarding its goals,
(2) that the University had already “achieved critical mass” under its raceholistic review, (3) that consideration of race was unnecessary because of
its minor impact on the student body, and (4) that there were plenty of
other race-neutral alternatives to achieve the University’s goals.122
Affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Court held: (1) that
the University had sufficiently specified its compelling interests, (2) that
the University had determined its goals had not quite been met, (3) that
the University should continue reviewing race in order to continue
narrowly tailor its interests, and (4) that none of the race-neutral
alternatives suggested by Fisher were a workable means for the
program.123
In this Note, I argued that by reviewing race in its admissions
process, the University violated the Equal Protection Clause. I urged a
plain reading of the phrase, “nor shall any state . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” because it
provides that every individual, no matter the circumstances, be granted the
equal protection of this country’s laws.124 Fisher’s race was reviewed as a
part of the admissions process and, because she was treated differently,
she should have been granted relied under the Constitution. The
122. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. 2198.
123. Id. at 2198-99.
124. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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University disadvantaged a handful of races and ethnic groups because it
did not uphold the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. I argued that
the Court should have ruled in a different manner—one more consistent
with that of the Hopwood case, which I think should still be the precedent
today. Lastly, I suggested that in order to comply with the Equal
Protection Clause, the University should completely exclude race from its
review process. Rather than looking at an applicant’s race, I asked that
the University focus more on achievements that students can control, such
as his or her academics and personal achievements outside of the
classroom. Diversity is a wonderful thing—however, a belief more in the
diversity of a person’s dedication, academic success, hobbies, and unique
abilities should be the factors that are weighed. In doing this, diversity
will be accomplished.
While we are all different in many ways, the race into which
someone is born into is not a choice. Therefore, someone should not be
held on a pedestal or given a special advantage for being born into a
certain category. Every person should be viewed as a human—and what
each human accomplishes in his or her life should determine his or her
potential. For this reason, perhaps we should turn a blind eye to “check
the box indicating your race.”
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